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Background: Modern anaesthetic practice relies upon the administration of a wide range of potent drugs
given by a variety of routes, at times in haste or under conditions of stress. Problems associated with drug
administration make up the largest group of incidents reported during anaesthesia, with outcomes
including major morbidity and death. It was decided to examine the role of a structured approach to the
diagnosis and management of drug problems under anaesthesia.
Objectives: To examine the role of a previously described core algorithm ‘‘COVER ABCD–A SWIFT
CHECK’’, supplemented by a specific sub-algorithm for drug problems, in the detection and management
of drug problems occurring in association with anaesthesia.
Methods: The potential performance of this structured approach for the relevant incidents among the first
4000 incidents reported to the Australian Incident Monitoring Study (AIMS) was compared with the actual
performances as reported by the anaesthetists involved.
Results: Among the first 4000 reports received by AIMS there were 1199 reports which detailed 1361
incidents involving the use of drugs. Contributing factors named included errors of judgement (20%), lack
of attention (17%), and drugs deemed to have been given in haste. Major morbidity or prolonged stay
ensued in over one quarter of reports and 15 patients (1.25%) died. Drug overdose, side effects, and
allergic reactions accounted for the majority of serious outcomes.
Conclusion: It was judged that the use of the COVER–ABCD algorithm during the course of an anaesthetic,
properly applied, would prevent many drug related incidents from occurring. The sub-algorithm presented
here provides a systematic framework for detecting the causes of drug related incidents.
M
odern anaesthetic practice relies upon the adminis-
tration of a wide range of (usually) potent drugs
given by a variety of routes, at times in haste or under
conditions of stress. The incidence of medication errors rises
markedly with polypharmacy.1 Pharmacological incidents
were the most commonly reported problem in the first 4000
incidents reported to the Australian Incident Monitoring
Study (AIMS), constituting 30% of all reports.2
A previously published paper by the AIMS group confined
itself to the ‘‘wrong’’ drug problem, concluding that syringe
swaps of labelled drugs was the most common incident,3
usually resulting from a ‘‘slip’’—this being the result of
‘‘absent mindedness’’.4 A number of preventative strategies
were proposed, including checking and rechecking of all
ampoules, drawing up and labelling of one drug at a time,
and supplying colour coded ampoules and syringes—for
example, the use of a syringe with a red plunger for
relaxants.5
In 1993 a ‘‘core’’ crisis management algorithm represented
by the mnemonic COVER ABCD–A SWIFT CHECK (the AB
precedes COVER for the non-intubated patient) was pro-
posed as the basis for a systematic approach to crisis
management during anaesthesia where it is not immediately
obvious what should be done or when actions taken have
failed to remedy the situation.6 This was validated against the
first 2000 incidents reported to AIMS. AIMS is an ongoing
study which involves the voluntary anonymous reporting of
any unintended incident which reduced or could have
reduced the safety margin for a patient.2
It was concluded that, if this algorithm had been correctly
applied, a functional diagnosis would have been reached
within 40–60 seconds in 99% of applicable incidents and the
learned sequence of actions represented by the COVER
portion would have led to appropriate steps being taken to
handle the 60% of problems relevant to this portion of the
algorithm.6 However, this study also showed that the 40% of
problems represented by the remainder of the algorithm
ABCD–A SWIFT CHECK were not always promptly diagnosed
or appropriately managed.2 6 7 It was decided that it would be
useful, for these remaining problems, to develop a set of sub-
algorithms in an easy-to-use crisis management manual.8
This study reports on the potential place of the COVER
ABCD–A SWIFT CHECK algorithm in the diagnosis and
initial management of pharmacological errors, provides an
outline of a specific crisis management sub-algorithm for
drug associated incidents during anaesthesia, and examines
the potential value of using this structured approach.
METHODS
Of the first 4000 incidents reported to AIMS, those which made
reference to drug incidents were extracted and analysed for
relevance, presenting features, causes, diagnosis and outcome.
Those due to vascular access problems and those resulting in (or
with the potential for) awareness are included but are dealt
with in greater depth elsewhere in this set of articles.9 10 For
completeness, problems arising from the administration of
blood and its products are also included in the analysis.
The COVER ABCD–A SWIFT CHECK algorithm, described
elsewhere in this series of articles,8 was applied to each
relevant report to determine the stages at which the problem
might have been diagnosed and to confirm that activating the
COVER portion would have led to appropriate initial steps
being taken. As drug problems are not completely dealt with
by this algorithm, a specific sub-algorithm was developed
(see fig 1) and its putative effectiveness was tested against
the reports. How this was done is described elsewhere in this
series of articles.8 The potential value of this structured
approach—that is, the application of COVER ABCD–A SWIFT
CHECK to the diagnosis and initial management of these
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problems, followed by the application of the sub-algorithm for
drug problems—was assessed in the light of the AIMS reports
by comparing its potential effectiveness for each incident with
that of the actual management as recorded in each report.
RESULTS
Among the first 4000 AIMS reports there were 1199 reports
involving drug incidents (30%). A total of 1361 drug related
incidents were reported as some incidents involved more
than one drug problem. Table 1 summarises the major
categories of incidents. The most common problems were
overdosage (20%) and giving the wrong drug (17%).
Many factors were judged to have contributed to the
incidents—most commonly, errors of judgement, (n=240,
20%); inattention (n=211, 18%); drugs given in haste
(n=200, 17%); and problems with communication
(n=163, 14%). Further details are given in table 2.
Outcomes from these incidents varied from no change
through to death. More than one outcome occurred in a
number of reports. For instance, patients suffering major
morbidity often progressed to a prolonged hospital stay or
unplanned high dependency admission. Table 3 provides a
summary of the outcomes.
Fifteen deaths were reported in this series (table 4). The




























































  	 

 		    
 













   '

  
 !"#$%&'()*+, -(),! % -%.*/' 0%' (- + 
  	
 1
2 ",# )! */ #)%.3 +! ) - ) +( (+ ! */ + )*'+ %/4 0%/ &1
 
$1'.	  
 	 	 234 	  5/333
 	 	 -!6 - 	 	   
 	6
$7'!8	 	  794 	 
 	6 )  167946 

 	 8	 	 : 
 		 224; & 734;
  	 1<46
$2'	
	 	=












$5'914 	  17@ 
   	  
  
 6 - 194 	   
  





 	  	 















 	      : 74










  A  	6
$@'(	* 
    	
 	 		 	
   	
 	  
	  	 

6




Figure 1 Drugs/vascular access.











Other drug incident 261*
*This includes wrong patient, wrong route, wrong timing,
wrong rate.
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to the administration of intrathecal local anaesthetics (four
cases). All involved relatively small doses of local anaesthetic
to frail elderly patients undergoing urgent or emergency
surgery. Three cases presented as hypotension and/or
bradycardia and the fourth as a high spinal with initial
respiratory embarrassment, progressing to cardiorespiratory
arrest. In retrospect, it was considered that the first three
patients were inadequately resuscitated before administra-
tion of the anaesthetic.
There were three reports involving fatal side effects when
drugs were given by routes other than intrathecal, including
one case in which, unknown to the anaesthetist, a drug was
administered by a surgeon. There were two reports of death
in association with blood products, one involving a patient
with unusual antibodies and the other an error in the
transfusion laboratory with transposition of labels of two
patients being cross matched at the same time. Other causes
were anaphylactic reactions in two reports, drug overdosage
in two reports, and giving the wrong drug in two reports. All
these fatal incidents may be considered a result of errors4
with the exception of the two deaths following anaphylaxis.
The majority of drug related deaths in this series were
therefore potentially avoidable.
Drug overdosage (33%), drug side effects (20%), and
allergic reactions to drugs (17%) accounted for most
incidents resulting in major morbidity in this series
(table 5). Not surprisingly, management of this group of
problems often resulted in ongoing high dependency care
and/or an abnormally prolonged hospital stay.
DISCUSSION
Problems related to the administration of drugs made up
1199 (30%) of the first 4000 reports received by AIMS.
Outcomes ranged from no change (47%) through to death in
15 reports (1.25%). Thus, drug related problems in this series
are common and many had serious consequences. The
majority may be regarded as potentially preventable, however
difficult in clinical practice this may be to achieve.
Adverse drug events are common throughout medical
practice and may result in serious consequences.11 12 Problems
frequently arise as a result of complex chains of events, so
robust systems must be in place to minimise or eliminate
such errors. A recent project reported significant reductions
in adverse drug events (27%) and a concurrent rise in error
detection and prevention (12%) resulting from changes in the
systems in place by which drugs were administered.13 These
improvements were sustained. An integrated drug adminis-
tration system specifically for use in anaesthesia has been
developed, also aimed at preventing drug administration
errors by reducing the number of steps, automating aspects
of the process, and rendering them more transparent.14 15
In the course of anaesthetic practice, where drugs are often
given during periods of haste and stress, the potential for
error remains great. Problems may result from several broad
groups of errors, starting with drawing up and labelling of
drugs in syringes, through to administration via any
apparatus and any route; the pharmacological effects and
side effects of the drug may also cause problems. Because
drug administration during anaesthesia is commonly by the
intravenous route, this paper should be regarded as a
companion to the paper dealing with problems with vascular
access which is presented elsewhere in this series.9
Incidents arising during the course of an anaesthetic may
frequently have a component attributable to a drug error,
interaction, effect or side effect. The use of COVER in the
Table 2 Factors contributing to the incident
(n = 1911)*
Factors No




Fault of technique 132
Inexperience 126










Unfamiliar environment or equipment 35
Inadequate assistance 26
Monitor problem 26
Pressure to proceed 22
Surgical team contribution 22
Relief anaesthetist or staff change 19
Sick patient 14
Lack of monitor 13
Lack of facility 9
Sick anaesthetist 6
Other equipment problems 46
Other stress 27
All other factors 137
*More than one factor was nominated in some reports.




Minor physiological change/minor morbidity 288
Major physiological change/major morbidity 212
Prolonged stay 65
Unplanned high dependency care 56
Awareness 39
Death 15
*More than one outcome was nominated in some reports.
Table 4 Causes of death (n = 15)
Cause No Comments
Sequelae of intrathecal local
anaesthetic administration
4 3 cases of hypotension and/
or bradycardia
Drug side effects* 3
Reaction to blood products 2 1 report of blood mislabelling
by transfusion
Allergy/anaphylaxis 2 1 to antibiotic, 1 to protamine
Drug overdose 2 Involving use of propofol in
elderly patients
Wrong drug 2 Air instead of 100% oxygen in
1 case
*Excluding intrathecal local anaesthetics.
Table 5 Causes of major morbidity (n = 212)
Type of incident No
Drug overdosage 71
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SCAN and CHECK modes should identify the majority of
sequelae from such incidents but, unless a drug (or blood
product) or vascular access problem is considered as part of
the ABCD sequence and specifically excluded, the cause of
the problem may be difficult to determine and therefore to
correct. A sub-algorithm is presented in fig 1 that provides a
systematic framework to locate and treat the common causes
of drug and vascular access problems. A ‘‘geographical’’
approach to aid in the detection of vascular access problems
is presented elsewhere in this series.9
The corrective strategies required will depend upon the
sequelae and range from simple drug cessation or reinstitu-
tion through to treatment of specific crisis situations that
result from or are associated with the medication error.
In conclusion, incidents relating to the administration (or
unintended non-administration) of drugs are very common
in anaesthetic practice. A myriad of presentations may ensue.
A drug problem or medication error should always be
considered as a possible cause of any incident arising in
association with the conduct of anaesthesia. The use of
COVER ABCD in the SCAN and CHECK modes regularly
during the course of an anaesthetic should prevent many
incidents from occurring and allow for early detection of
evolving problems. The sub-algorithm presented here pro-
vides a systematic framework for identifying problems
arising from drug administration. The sequelae of drug
related incidents may require other specific crisis manage-
ment sub-algorithms presented elsewhere in this series of
papers to be invoked.
Finally, it is important that a full explanation of what
happened be given to the patient, that the event and the
results of any tests should be documented in the anaesthetic
record and, if appropriate, that the patient be given a letter to
warn future anaesthetists. A permanent warning bracelet
may be required for the patient. If a particular precipitating
event was significant or a particular action was useful in
resolving the crisis, this should be clearly explained and
documented.
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Key messages
N From the first 4000 incidents reported to AIMS, 1361
incidents were identified within 1199 reports (30%)
that involved drug related incidents.
N The most common pharmacological incidents were
overdosage (273 incidents), wrong drug (236 inci-
dents), side effect (198 incidents), underdosage (145
incidents), and allergic manifestations (109 incidents).
N The most common contributing factors reported were
error of judgement (240 incidents), inattention (211
incidents), haste (200 incidents), communication
problem (163 incidents), and technical fault (132
incidents).
N The outcome from 1243 analysable incidents ranged
from no change (568 cases) through major physiolo-
gical change/major morbidity (212 cases) to aware-
ness (39 cases) and death (15 cases, 1.25%).
N The most common cause of death (n = 4) was sequelae
of intrathecal administration of a local anaesthetic. Two
other fatal cases involved anaphylaxis.
N The most common cause of major morbidity was drug
overdosage (n = 71) and drug side effects (n = 43).
N The common occurrence of incidents in anaesthetic
practice relating to drug administration (or non-
administration) necessitates that this always be con-
sidered as a possible cause of a problem developing
during the conduct of anaesthesia.
N The specific sub-algorithm presented in this paper
provides a systematic framework for identifying
problems arising from drug administration. The
sequelae of such incidents may require other specific
crisis management sub-algorithms described in this
series of papers to be invoked.
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